Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU:
Setting Policy-Specific Conditionality and Building Domestic Capacities by Langbein, Julia
www.ssoar.info
Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the
EU: Setting Policy-Specific Conditionality and
Building Domestic Capacities
Langbein, Julia
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Langbein, J. (2011). Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU: Setting Policy-Specific Conditionality
and Building Domestic Capacities. (KFG Working Paper Series, 33). Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, FB Politik- und
Sozialwissenschaften, Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft Kolleg-Forschergruppe "The Transformative Power of
Europe". https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-373953
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Organizing Regulatory Convergence 
Outside the EU 
Setting Policy-Specific Conditionality and Building  
Domestic Capacities 
Julia Langbein
No. 33 | December 2011
WORKING PAPER 
2 | KFG Working Paper No. 33| December 2011 
KFG Working Paper Series
Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe “The Transformative Power of Europe”
The KFG Working Paper Series serves to disseminate the research results of the Kolleg-Forschergruppe by making 
them available to a broader public. It means to enhance academic exchange as well as to strengthen and broaden 
existing basic research on internal and external diffusion processes in Europe and the European Union.  
All KFG Working Papers are available on the KFG website at www.transformeurope.eu or can be ordered in print via 
email to transform-europe@fu-berlin.de.
Copyright for this issue: Julia Langbein
Editorial assistance and production: Farina Ahäuser, André Berberich, Jessica Beck, Corinna Blutguth, Dominik Maier
Langbein, Julia 2011: Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU. Setting Policy-Specific Conditionality and 
Building Domestic Capacities, KFG Working Paper Series 33, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of 
Europe”, Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin. 
ISSN 1868-6834 (Print)
ISSN 1868-7601 (Internet)
This publication has been funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Freie Universität Berlin
Kolleg-Forschergruppe
“The Transformative Power of Europe: 




Phone: +49 (0)30- 838 57033
Fax: +49 (0)30- 838 57096
transform-europe@fu-berlin.de
www.transformeurope.eu
                                Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU  | 3
Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU




Why is regulatory convergence towards EU rules more successful in some policy fields than in others within 
one EU neighboring country? By comparing Ukraine’s convergence towards EU rules in the field of shareholders’ 
rights and technical standards, I challenge prominent explanations for policy change outside the EU that empha-
size misfit and adaptational costs, the institutionalization of EU rules or policy-specific conditionality. In order 
to deal with the shortcomings of these explanations, it is necessary to disaggregate incentives and capacities of 
various domestic actors within the particular policy fields. I argue that regulatory convergence in EU neighboring 
countries is more likely if external actors combine the application of policy-specific conditionality, such as access 
to the European market, with multiplex capacity-building measures that diversify demand among domestic state 
regulators and firms and empower them to make their claims.
The Author
Julia Langbein is a post-doctoral fellow at the Research College “The 
Transformative Power of Europe” at Freie Universität Berlin. Her research 
interests include European integration, transnationalization, regulatory 
politics and the political economy of post-communist transitions. She holds 
a PhD from the European University Institute in Florence and degrees in 
Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin and the European University at 
St. Petersburg. She acts as visiting assistant professor for European integration 
at Freie Universität Berlin in the winter term 2011/12.
Contact: julia.langbein@fu-berlin.de
4 | KFG Working Paper No. 33| December 2011 
Contents
1.  Introduction         5
2.  Mapping Divergent Outcomes: Initial Misfit and Policy Change in          
     Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights and Technical Standards   7
2.1  Shareholders‘ Rights        8
2.2  Technical Standards        8
3.   Puzzling Policy Change in Ukraine      9
3.1  Misfit and Adaptational Costs       9
3.2  Institutionalization of EU Rules       10        
3.3  Policy-Specific Conditionality       11     
3.4  Multiplex and Dyadic Capacity-Building      12
4.   Policy Change in Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights    13
5.   Policy Change in Ukraine’s Technical Standards    18
6.   Alternative Explanations       21
7.   Conclusion         23
Literature          25
                                Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU  | 5
1. Introduction1
During the past two decades students of European integration have dealt extensively with the question 
how European Union (EU) member states or candidate countries adapt to EU rules. However, we still know 
relatively little about the specific factors driving (non-)convergence towards EU rules in EU neighboring 
countries (ENCs) (Schimmelfennig 2009; Börzel 2010). This paper seeks to fill this theoretical and empirical 
gap by investigating why regulatory convergence is more successful in some policy fields than in others in 
the ENCs.
Drawing on a detailed analysis of post-Soviet Ukraine from the mid-1990s onwards,2 this paper advances 
a “backward-looking research design” (Scharpf 1997). I begin with mapping variation on the dependent 
variable and subsequently trace factors accounting for cross-policy variation in regulatory convergence to-
wards EU rules, i.e. the decreasing distance of national regulatory practices and governance arrangements 
towards the EU’s regulatory model applied in the single market.3 More precisely, I will examine regulatory 
convergence along two dimensions: rule adoption, i.e. the transposition of EU legislation into national law, 
and the presence of forms of public-private governance arrangements based on internal rules that corre-
spond to formal EU rules.4 The latter dimension is crucial since interventionist forms of regulation through 
public actors, as practised in most ENCs during state socialism, no longer constitute the most frequent 
governance arrangements within the EU single market or beyond. Private actors increasingly participate 
in the setting, monitoring and enforcement of rules and standards (Héritier 2002; Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004; 
Cafaggi 2006). Examining the existence of public-private governance arrangements that correspond to EU 
rules allows me to assess the progress achieved in particular policy fields in a more nuanced way given 
that the adoption of EU rules rarely lead to a straight implementation in the ENCs (Freyburg et al. 2009; 
Langbein/Wolczuk 2011).
The comparison will focus on two market-related policy fields with diverse outcomes in terms of regulatory 
convergence: shareholders’ rights and technical standards. In the field of shareholders’ rights, Ukraine 
transferred respective EU rules to its legal system in 2008. Further, the corresponding governance arrange-
ments needed for the enforcement of these rules, i.e. the establishment of a Securities Commission and a 
stock exchange which shall cooperate in monitoring the application of shareholders’ rights, have been set 
1 I would like to thank László Bruszt, Tanja A. Börzel, Jacint Jordana, Joseph Jupille, David Levi-Faur, Olga Markiewicz, 
Gary Marks and my colleagues of the Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe” for their most help-
ful comments.
2 This starting point for the analysis was chosen because Ukraine and the EU formally signed their Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), the first official agreement between both parties to envisage the approximation of 
Ukrainian legislation to the EU acquis, in 1994. The PCA came into force only in 1998 as it took EU member states 
four years to ratify the document. Notwithstanding, Ukraine’s then President Leonid Kuchma announced EU mem-
bership as a strategic goal as early as 1996 in order to accelerate ratification (Wolczuk 2004).
3 This definition of regulatory convergence corresponds to what Heichel et al. have termed “delta-convergence”, 
which describes a “decreasing distance of policies towards an exemplary model, for example, a model promoted 
by an international organization or a frontrunner country” (Heichel et al. 2005: 833).
4 For reasons of scope, I do not analyze two other dimensions of regulatory convergence, namely whether public 
and private actors possess regulatory capacities needed for the regulation of the policy field and rule implementa-
tion (for more on these issues, see Langbein 2010).
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up. By contrast, in the field of technical standards, which entails the setting, monitoring and enforcement 
of standards for industrial products, only some selective adoption of EU rules took place in the time period 
under scrutiny. Furthermore, the corresponding governance arrangements have only been partially set up. 
Ukraine’s state standardization body, the State Department for Technical Regulation and Consumer Policy 
(DSSU), is still pursuing most of the regulatory tasks relating to technical standards, while EU rules prescribe 
the cooperation of state regulators, private certifiers and firms for regulating technical standards.
So far, the literature on policy change in the European neighborhood has largely ignored cross-policy varia-
tion within one country and rather focused on cross-country comparisons. In this respect, authors usually 
distinguish between “most-likely” and “least-likely” cases for convergence towards EU rules in the region. 
Among the Eastern neighborhood countries Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are widely considered to be 
the most willing EU partners given their membership aspirations and highly asymmetric relationship with 
the EU. By contrast, Armenia and Azerbaijan are considered to be more resistant to convergence towards 
EU rules (Börzel 2010; Franke et al. 2010; Gawrich et al. 2010). Yet, macro-level comparisons overlook a 
great deal of cross-policy variation occurring even within assumed “frontrunners” among the ENCs, such 
as Ukraine, thereby making the distinction between most-likely and least-likely cases for convergence with 
EU rules in terms of countries obsolete.
Having said this, some recent studies have taken a cross-sectoral approach and focus on meso-level factors 
to explain diverse outcomes in terms of regulatory convergence. The most prominent explanations in this 
respect concern 1) various degrees of misfit between national and European policies resulting in different 
adaptational costs for domestic actors (Börzel 2010), 2) the degree of institutionalization of a particular 
policy in terms of precision, legally binding rules and legitimacy (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009; Freyburg 
et al. 2009 ), and 3) different degrees of policy-specific conditionality, i.e. specific rewards tied to conver-
gence within a particular policy field (Gawrich et al. 2010; Langbein/Wolczuk 2011; Ademmer/Börzel forth-
coming). This paper challenges these existing approaches in order to explain cross-policy variation within 
one EU neighbor. I will show that these approaches cannot sufficiently explain the variation observed in 
the Ukrainian case as they are constant across the two cases or because their predictions are at odds with 
the observed outcomes.
By deploying qualitative methods of process tracing, this paper advances a different argument. I show that 
policy-specific conditionality is, indeed, necessary to trigger at least partial regulatory convergence by in-
creasing the incentives of domestic actors to support policy change. At the same time, the form of capacity-
building measures has a decisive impact on the level of regulatory convergence as it shapes the capacities of 
domestic actors to make their claims. I draw upon Bruszt and McDermott (2009) and distinguish between 
multiplex and dyadic forms of capacity-building measures. Multiplex forms of capacity-building measures 
provided by external actors target multiple public and private domestic actors who are needed to demand, 
set and enforce externally promoted rules and norms in a particular policy sector. These multiple domestic 
actors can include government agencies, regulatory authorities, business associations, firms or experts. By 
contrast, dyadic forms of capacity-building measures only occur between two actors, such as the target 
government and an international organization. Against this backdrop, I argue that the likelihood of strong 
regulatory convergence increases if policy-specific conditionality is flanked by multiplex capacity-building 
measures. The combined effects of these mechanisms increase the incentives and capacities of domestic 
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public and private actors to support policy change. Yet, if policy-specific conditionality is only flanked by 
dyadic capacity-building that targets public authorities, but neglects private actors such as firms and their 
business associations, convergence towards EU rules is likely to reach lower levels.
This argument dovetails with the findings of students of institutional change and regulatory governance. 
The first group argues that market access alone, here defined as a form of conditionality, does not suffice 
to foster institutional development (Rodrik et al. 2004; Bruszt/McDermott 2009). As mentioned earlier, the 
latter stresses that international markets, including the European single market, are based on governance 
arrangements in which public and private actors cooperate in the setting, monitoring and enforcement 
of rules and norms (Héritier 2002; Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004; Cafaggi 2006). Consequently, any capacity-
building initiated by external actors needs to target both public and private domestic actors as both are 
needed for the governance of markets.
The paper proceeds in the following steps. Section two maps the divergent outcomes in the two policy 
fields under scrutiny. I show that despite equally high misfit between national and EU rules in the early 
1990s, regulatory convergence towards EU rules has progressed more successfully with regard to Ukraine’s 
shareholders’ rights than with regard to technical standards. Section three presents the puzzle in more 
detail. I show that prominent explanations for differential policy change cannot explain the observed varia-
tion. Using insights from the existing literature on institutional change in the context of EU enlargement 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), I hypothesize that the combined effects of policy-specific 
conditionality and the type of external capacity-building shape domestic incentives and capacities for pol-
icy change and account for cross-policy variation in regulatory convergence. Sections four and five present 
my empirical data: Based on an in-depth analysis of primary documents, expert interviews and secondary 
literature, I trace the process leading to various policy changes in Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights and techni-
cal standards for over a decade. Section six discusses alternative explanations. Finally, the conclusion sum-
marizes the major findings and key arguments and discusses implications for policy change in the European 
neighborhood.
2. Mapping Divergent Outcomes: Initial Misfit and Policy Change in Ukraine’s  
 Shareholders’ Rights and Technical Standards
In the mid-1990s, the misfit between Ukrainian and EU rules in the fields of shareholders’ rights and techni-
cal standards in terms of rule adoption and the presence of public-private governance arrangements was 
high:5
5 The initial misfit between Ukrainian and EU rules and the diverse outcomes in the fields of shareholders’ rights and 
technical standards are discussed in-depth elsewhere (Langbein 2010).
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2.1  Shareholders’ Rights
In the mid-1990s, Ukraine did not have any regulations that allowed shareholders to raise their “voice”, i.e. 
the ability to express their interests guaranteed through the transparent flow of information and disclosure 
policies, as prescribed by respective EU directives.6 Further, shareholders lacked the right to “exit”, i.e. to 
“liquidate their holdings by selling shares in case they are not satisfied with the way a company is managed” 
(Pistor 2000: 72) through share redemption at the market price. With regard to public-private governance 
arrangements, securities commissions and stock exchanges are defined as crucial regulators safeguard-
ing the protection of shareholders’ rights on the European single market (ESME 2007). Yet, none of the 
Ukrainian laws foresaw the establishment of a regulatory body that would initiate, implement and monitor 
compliance (EBRD 1999). Furthermore, none of the Ukrainian laws at that time required stock exchanges 
to introduce listing requirements for the admission of their companies (Okunev 2005). In 1994, Ukraine 
thus lacked forms of public-private governance that would monitor or enforce the protection of shares. 
Unsurprisingly, the earliest available general assessment of corporate governance regulation in Ukraine 
found “very low compliance” with international standards (EBRD 1999).
Since then, regulatory convergence has made significant progress in the field of shareholders’ rights. As 
far as the adoption of EU rules by the Ukrainian parliament is concerned, the legislative changes pursued 
in the field of shareholders’ rights in 2008 resulted in full compliance with EU rules (European Commission 
2009, 2010). Further, in the field of shareholders’ rights public-private governance arrangements exist as 
prescribed by respective EU directives. Not only did Ukraine establish a Securities Commission in 1996, 
which has the task to adopt and enforce shareholders’ rights, but, in the same year, a market-owned stock 
exchange began to operate, which is needed to introduce listing requirements and monitor the application 
of the market price when shares are traded (European Commission 2004).
2.2  Technical Standards
In the mid-1990s, Ukraine’s public authorities required mandatory technical standards for producers of 
industrial products due to the country’s Soviet past. In contrast, on the European single market, public 
authorities were supposed to solely develop mandatory requirements regarding the safety and quality of 
industrial products, while the standards for technical solutions to meet these requirements were volun-
tary. Furthermore, the Ukrainian system of technical standards was governed by a centralized regulatory 
body, the DSSU, which was in charge of all regulatory tasks, ranging from standardization, accreditation, 
conformity assessment to market surveillance in 1994 (Palianytsia 2005). The monopoly over regulatory 
power contradicted the decentralized governance arrangements applied in the EU, which prescribed that 
the regulatory tasks shall be distributed among different organizations, both public and private (AFNOR-
6 Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on insider dealing; Directive 2001/34/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the admission of securities to official stock exchange listings 
and on information to be published on those securities; Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 21 April 2004 on takeover bids; Directive 2007/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 July 2007 on the exercise of certain rights of shareholders in listed companies.
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SWEDAC-UNI Consortium 2004; European Commission 2008; UEPLAC 2008). Hence, public regulation 
through the DSSU was the main form of governance in the field of technical standards in Ukraine in the 
mid-1990s. Manufacturers did not have any regulatory responsibilities. On the European single market, 
certain regulatory tasks are, however, delegated to private actors, i.e. manufacturers who are in charge 
of enforcing specific safety and quality requirements before the product is placed on the market. Public 
authorities only carry out sample inspections after the products are placed on the market.
Despite an equally high misfit as in the field of shareholders’ rights, Ukraine has only yet reached partial 
convergence in terms of rule adoption and the presence of governance arrangements in the field of techni-
cal standards. In 2001 and 2010, Ukraine adopted some laws which were supposed to increase compliance 
with EU rules by decentralizing regulatory power in the field of technical standards. However, existing 
national legislation either contradicts these laws or the adopted laws have not come into effect due to the 
lack of secondary legislation needed for the implementation of these laws. The regulatory authority DSSU 
is still in charge of setting, enforcing and monitoring technical standards, even though EU rules prescribe 
the distribution of these tasks across different public authorities or private actors. Ukraine has only es-
tablished a separate public authority for the accreditation of conformity assessment bodies, which is the 
National Agency for Accreditation (NAAU). 
As the next section will show, prominent approaches to explain cross-policy variation in regulatory con-
vergence towards EU rules in the European neighborhood cannot account for the diverse outcomes in 
Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights and technical standards.
3. Puzzling Policy Change in Ukraine
Early research on the EU’s neighborhood considered policy change in the region as being doomed to failure 
due to the absence of membership conditionality, which is conceived of being the key mechanism the 
EU employed to foster policy change in the Central and East European candidate countries (Kelley 2006; 
Schimmelfennig/Scholtz 2008). Yet, even across and within candidate countries convergence with EU rules 
varied despite the reward of EU membership (Jacoby 2004; Epstein 2008). Consequently, more recent ac-
counts on policy change beyond the EU have called for a more nuanced analysis to explain the diverse do-
mestic changes happening beyond the EU’s borders (Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009; Freyburg et al. 2009; 
Börzel 2010; Langbein/Wolczuk 2011).
3.1  Misfit and Adaptational Costs
Drawing upon the Europeanization scholarship dealing with EU member states and candidate countries, 
some authors emphasize misfit between national and EU rules and adaptational costs for domestic actors 
to explain policy change in the ENCs (Börzel 2010). While similar degrees of misfit do not necessarily result 
in similar outcomes, the presence of veto players and their adaptational costs are a crucial mediating 
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variable for domestic change (see also Börzel/Risse 2003; Dimitrova/Dragneva 2010). If the adaptational 
pressures, which emanate from variation in national and EU rules, are congruent with the preferences and 
capacities of domestic veto players, EU rules do not represent a constraint, but rather an opportunity and 
require low adaptational costs (Börzel/Risse 2003; Börzel 2010). Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the 
higher the adaptational costs for domestic actors, the less likely that convergence with EU rules will reach 
high levels, and vice versa.
In the context of Ukraine’s privatization of state-owned enterprises, which took place largely throughout 
the 1990s, transparent shareholders’ rights and disclosure policies would have caused high adaptational 
costs for Ukrainian businessmen. Their dominant interest was not to attract investments, but to seize con-
trol of assets, which was much easier in the absence of shareholders’ rights (see also Heinrich et al. 2007). 
Ukrainian businessmen maintained close ties with legislators and state officials, preventing any support 
for policy change from these groups. As for technical standards, the EU introduced a massive reduction of 
import tariffs for Ukrainian machinery through the General System of Preferences (GSP) in 1993. Due to 
the existence of alternative markets in the former Soviet Republics and financial constraints in the context 
of Ukraine’s economic crisis throughout the 1990s, the costs of convergence still exceeded the benefits of 
access to the EU market. Further, the centralized regulatory body, the DSSU, was not willing to hand over 
certain tasks to other public bodies or private entities. The bureaucrats in the Ministries of Economy and 
Industrial Policy feared the costs of re-organizing a whole new institutional framework for technical regu-
lation in the absence of pro-reform constituencies. Finally, the Ukrainian parliament was infiltrated with 
representatives of Ukraine’s heavy machinery industry and was therefore hardly interested in initiating 
legislative reforms (for a detailed analysis, see Langbein 2010).
Summing up, in Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights and technical standards, the adaptational pressures resulting 
from the initial “misfit” between national and EU rules created equally high adaptational costs for domes-
tic state regulators and firms in the mid-1990s.7 Explanations emphasizing initial misfit and adaptational 
costs do thus not solve the puzzle why Ukraine has so far achieved better results in terms of regulatory 
convergence towards EU rules in shareholders’ rights than in technical standards.
3.2 Institutionalization of EU Rules
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) argue that different levels of institutionalization of EU rules can ac-
count for differential policy change in the ENCs. The stronger external rules are institutionalized, i.e. precise, 
legally binding and legitimate, the more likely that third countries will adopt and implement these rules 
(Lavenex/Schimmelfennig 2009: 802f; 808). From this perspective, convergence in technical standards 
7 The preferences of Ukrainian consumers are not analyzed since civil society movements, for example in the form 
of consumer organizations, are not well developed and passive in post-communist states, and even less so in 
post-Soviet countries like Ukraine (Howard 2003; McFaul 2002). Even the mass demonstrations during Ukraine’s 
so-called “Orange Revolution” in 2004-2005 can be seen as the result of spontaneous protests against the politi-
cal regime rather than the product of an organized and well-established civil society (Melnykovska/Schweickert 
2008).
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should have reached higher levels since EU rules are more institutionalized in that area than in share-
holders’ rights: Both fields involve an acquis and their regulation is based on directives, regulations and 
harmonization. However, in the case of technical standards, the European Commission and Ukraine have in 
addition agreed on a separate Action Plan for the Free Movement of Industrial Products in 2005 (European 
Commission 2006). This separate Action Plan outlines a schedule for domestic policy reforms and lists the 
EU directives that Ukraine must comply with in order to achieve regulatory convergence. In technical stan-
dards, EU requirements are thus formulated more precisely than in shareholders’ rights, where a separate 
Action Plan does not exist.
When considering the legitimacy of EU rules, the number of infringement cases being opened by the 
European Commission against EU member states as well as the international acknowledgment of European 
rules and standards are good indicators. From this perspective, too, EU technical standards are more in-
stitutionalized than EU shareholders’ rights. While EU technical standards and shareholders’ rights are 
internationally acknowledged standards, legitimacy within the EU is higher in technical standards than in 
shareholders’ rights considering that infringements against EU member states occur more often in cor-
porate law, which includes shareholders’ rights, than in trade related fields such as technical standards 
(Börzel et al. 2011). These findings would suggest that third countries like Ukraine align more easily with 
highly institutionalized EU technical standards than with less institutionalized EU shareholders’ rights. The 
theoretical expectation is, however, at odds with the real outcomes as discussed in section 2 and therefore 
cannot explain the Ukrainian puzzle.
3.3 Policy-Specific Conditionality
Finally, some scholars underline that policy-specific conditionality explains policy change in the ENCs. In 
the absence of EU membership conditionality in the ENCs, the EU and other international actors tie other 
rewards to convergence with EU rules. For instance, Vachudova stresses that the “promise of greater par-
ticipation in the internal market will be the catalyst for any reform momentum that develops within the 
ENC process” (2007: 98). Gawrich et al. (2010) detail that access to the EU single market as well as interna-
tional markets is likely to trigger convergence towards EU rules in fields of economic regulation, while visa 
facilitation is likely to increase domestic incentives in the ENC for convergence in Justice and Home Affairs 
(see also Langbein/Wolczuk 2011; Ademmer/Börzel forthcoming). These expectations dovetail with stu-
dents of international political economy, who would expect that countries are more likely to take on (even 
costly) international rules and standards where markets are liberalized (Vogel/Kagan 2004). Accordingly, 
sectoral variation in market liberalization is expected to explain differential policy change.
However, the economic incentives tied to regulatory convergence in Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights and 
technical standards are equally high and cannot sufficiently explain cross-policy variation. In both fields, 
convergence towards EU rules would facilitate immediate access to the European and international mar-
kets. Ukrainian firms should thus have great incentives to take on European norms and standards: With 
regard to shareholders’ rights, the economic incentive that is at stake for Ukrainian firms amounts to ac-
cess to European and international capital markets and investments. EU directives lay down that stock 
12 | KFG Working Paper No. 33| December 2011 
exchanges must adopt the protection of shareholders’ rights as a requirement for being listed. Accordingly, 
stock exchanges in London or Frankfurt, and more recently in Warsaw, refer to transparency, disclosure 
practices and fair treatment of shareholders as listing requirements (see e.g. Warsaw Stock Exchange 2007; 
London Stock Exchange 2010). Similar requirements hold for other international stock exchanges. In the 
case of shareholders’ rights, Ukrainian firms and state agencies can thus expect increased investments 
from the capitalization of assets on European capital markets in exchange for convergence with EU share-
holders’ rights.
The situation in technical standards is similar: The EU market has been relatively open for Ukrainian ma-
chinery, which is the most affected industrial sector of convergence in technical standards. Since 1993, 
the EU has been offering Ukraine’s machinery sector unilateral trade concessions through the so-called 
Generalised System of Preferences. In this context, the EU set a considerably lower tariff for Ukrainian 
machinery and equipment than for other product groups, such as agriculture. In addition, EU technical 
standards are internationally acknowledged standards. If Ukrainian producers comply with these stan-
dards, they will also have access to international markets.
Thus, policy-specific conditionality exists in both policy fields under scrutiny and can be expected to be a 
necessary condition for at least some progress with regard to regulatory convergence, despite high initial 
misfit and adaptational costs. The argument does not, however, explain why convergence in Ukraine’s 
shareholders’ rights progresses more successfully than in technical standards.
3.4 Multiplex and Dyadic Capacity-Building
In order to explain cross-policy variation, this paper builds upon the argument that capacity-building mea-
sures provided by external donors in the form of assistance and the inclusion of local actors in transnational 
networks are likely to shape policy change in the ENCs (Börzel 2010; Gawrich et al. 2010; Langbein 2010). 
Assistance encompasses the externally sponsored transfer of knowledge, skills and financial resources 
through seminars, trainings or exchange of experts and empowers domestic actors to build or change their 
regulatory institutions (Andonova 2003; Jacoby 2006). The participation in regulatory networks facilitates 
lesson-drawing through which domestic regulators, who have become dissatisfied with a particular situa-
tion at home, may become acquainted with new solutions to domestic policy problems as a result of the 
interaction with their peers in regulatory networks (Rose 1991; Slaughter 2004). With regard to dynamics 
in the European neighborhood, Freyburg et al. (2009) argue that increasing participation in regulatory 
networks that promote the transfer of EU rules is likely to increase the adaptation of EU rules.
Students of Europeanization have already underscored the importance of assistance and lesson-drawing 
through regulatory networks in the context of EU enlargement. However, they have not acknowledged 
the dyadic or multiplex nature of these mechanisms and therefore ignore the root cause for differential 
domestic empowerment for institution building in the context of accession and non-accession countries. 
According to Bruszt and McDermott (2009), interactions between external and domestic actors can be “dy-
adic” and only occur between two actors, such as the target government and an international organization. 
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Interactions can also be “multiplex”, however, and involve and empower more state and non-state actors, 
like domestic and foreign firms, business associations, experts and regulatory bodies.
Drawing upon Bruszt and McDermott’s line of argumentation, I hypothesize that assistance provided by 
external actors is particularly effective in fostering domestic change if interactions are multiplex, i.e. if 
knowledge is disseminated to both public and private actors. External donors, foreign companies and busi-
ness associations can diversify the range of non-state actors by providing on-site training for domestic com-
panies (Gereffi/Wyman 1990). Further, they can organize meetings for domestic business associations and 
their foreign counterparts to coordinate and bind interests for lobbying and monitoring activities (Yakova 
2005/06). I further hypothesize that the participation of domestic actors in regulatory networks is particu-
larly effective if it facilitates lesson-drawing of both private and public actors.
The following two sections explore policy change in the fields of shareholders’ rights and technical stan-
dards in Ukraine from the mid-1990s onwards on the basis of process tracing. Special attention will be given 
to the combined effects of policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building measures on the incentives 
and capacities of domestic state regulators and firms to promote or hamper regulatory convergence to-
wards EU rules in the two policy fields. 
4. Policy Change in Ukraine’s Shareholders’ Rights
The privatization of state-owned assets dominated large slices of Ukraine’s political and economic life from 
the early 1990s onwards. At that time, Ukraine’s securities trading business was not a flourishing sector 
given that 67 percent of the newly privatized companies had not opted to trade their shares publicly on 
stock markets (SSMSC 1998). As mentioned earlier, Ukrainian businessmen were first and foremost inter-
ested in acquiring assets rather than capitalizing them. Back then, the benefits of maintaining messy own-
ership structures and weak protection of shareholders outweighed the reward of market access despite 
the fact that the protection of shareholders’ rights was and is an important requirement in order to get 
listed on European stock exchanges. 
Notwithstanding domestic opposition to reforms of Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights, international donors be-
came active promoters of change. In this respect, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) sought to create domestic demand among Ukrainian brokers and dealers through various training 
sessions and seminars. This group soon understood that the image of Ukraine’s market must improve in or-
der to attract more capitalization among Ukrainian companies as well as foreign investment. For Ukrainian 
brokers and dealers, the policy-specific conditionality that tied the protection of shareholders’ rights to 
access to the European and other international financial markets created a strong incentive for the support 
of respective domestic reforms. In order to improve the organization of these pro-reform forces, USAID 
initiated the creation of the Persha Fondova Torghova Systema (PFTS) Association, a self-regulatory orga-
nization for securities traders in Ukraine, in 1996.8 In the same year, USAID provided the PFTS Association 
8 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (A), Kyiv, 13 November 
2008.
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with the technical assistance to create the PFTS Trading System, which was the first market-owned stock 
exchange in Ukraine. Thanks to the PFTS’ modern technology and a slow but gradual re-orientation among 
some of Ukraine’s Joint-Stock Companies (JSCs) towards the capitalization of their assets, PFTS quickly 
became the most important Ukrainian stock exchange.9 In 1998, the PFTS accounted for 65 percent of the 
market (SSMSC 1998).
As far as the public side for the regulation of shareholders’ rights is concerned, USAID and the International 
Finance Cooperation (IFC) criticized the lack of stock market regulation in Ukraine, leaving this task very 
much to the market which resulted in illegal takeovers and share dilution.10 As mentioned earlier, parts of 
Ukraine’s state administration profited from the lack of regulation and subsequent rent-seeking. However, 
as a result of the economic downturn that hit the country during the 1990s, the government changed its 
position and began to support the creation of regulatory arrangements aimed at attracting foreign invest-
ment and creating a flourishing Ukrainian capital market. In 1996, the Ukrainian government established 
the Securities and Stock Market State Commission (SSMSC) as an independent agency under the President 
of Ukraine, accountable to the Ukrainian parliament.
Capacity-building measures by external actors to promote regulatory convergence in Ukraine’s sharehold-
ers’ rights became increasingly multiplex. Since its establishment, Ukraine’s Securities Commission SSMSC 
has been the recipient of wide-ranging external assistance and its members quickly started to participate 
in transnational networks. As early as 1996, USAID and the IFC prompted SSMSC’s membership in the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The IOSCO develops numerous regulatory 
principles for Securities Commissions, for example that the owners of securities in a company should 
be treated fairly according to the Principles of Corporate Governance of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). The SSMSC’s membership in the IOSCO has not only facilitated 
exchange and knowledge transfer between Ukrainian and international securities’ regulators, but has 
also increased the capacities of the SSMSC’s staff to draft legislation in accordance with international and 
European standards (SSMSC 2000).11
Another priority of external capacity-building concerned the drafting of a Joint-Stock Company Law (JSC 
Law), which should prescribe the protection of shareholders’ rights according to European and interna-
tional best practice. External donors were particularly keen to ensure “voice” for all shareholders. The 
JSC Law should lay down detailed prescriptions on the information policy regarding general sharehold-
ers’ meetings and financial reports. In terms of “exit”, donors wanted to make sure that the law would 
prescribe share redemption at market prices in cases of mergers or takeovers, and transparent disclosure 
policies concerning changes in ownership in order to protect minority shareholders from share dilution.12
9 Interview with staff member from Persha Fondova Rynka, Kyiv, 25 September 2009; Interview with Ukrainian ex-
pert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 October 2009.
10 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (A), Kyiv, 13 November 
2008; Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 
October 2009; Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance (C), Kyiv, 22 October 2009.
11 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (A), Kyiv, 13 November 
2008; Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 
October 2009.
12 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (A), Kyiv, 13 November 
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In 1998, a “Corporate Governance Task Force” was created to oversee the drafting of the law. The task force 
included various domestic private and public actors in support of regulatory convergence who had come 
into being or were empowered to make their claims as a result of the multiplex capacity-building measures 
initiated by international donors. The Head of the SSMSC chaired this task force. Apart from SSMSC staff 
members, the task force also comprised Ukrainian lawyers, a PFTS representative, and experts working for 
USAID, the IFC, as well as for diverse EU programs (Dragneva/Dimitrova 2010).13 At first, European experts 
provided the IFC with respective EU directives, which were then translated into Ukrainian, with a view to 
their serving as a template for the draft law. On that basis, SSMSC began drafting a JSC Law. A Kiev-based 
expert working for an international donor organization explains why the use of EU rules as a template for 
Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights did not contradict the interests of the IFC or USAID:
“The EU market is Ukraine’s closest market. Moreover, Ukraine committed itself to approximate its legisla-
tion to the EU acquis in the context of the PCA (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement; J. L.). Despite 
the fact that the organization I am working for is not European, we still try to provide advice that does not 
contradict EU rules or European practices since we believe that European integration is in Ukraine’s biggest 
interest.”14
While external donors placed more emphasis on the legal protection of “voice” and “exit”, the PFTS 
Association was also interested in abolishing the legal form of Closed Joint-Stock Companies (CJSCs) in 
order to increase transparency and the number of official transactions. In this respect, the PFTS suggested 
that only public JSCs and companies with limited liabilities shall be allowed to exist. This would force an 
increasing number of CJSCs to publicly trade their shares on the stock market and respect the rights of 
shareholders in terms of “voice” and “exit”.15 By the end of 1999, the SSMSC presented the first draft law. 
After having received the approval of the Task Force, the draft law was submitted to the Ukrainian parlia-
ment. In 2001, the JSC Draft Law was, however, rejected by the legislator since managers and owners of 
CJSCs dominated the Ukrainian parliament (Dragneva/Dimitrova 2010). They were still more interested 
in maintaining full control of their companies than in capitalizing their assets on international markets. At 
that time, the reward of market access was thus not strong enough to overcome domestic opposition to 
regulatory convergence among large parts of Ukrainian business and state bureaucracy.
The recovery of Ukraine’s economy from 2000 onwards, however, increased the costs of non-convergence 
for various Ukrainian businessmen and greatly facilitated the promotion of shareholders’ rights through in-
ternational donors. Slowly but surely, a small yet increasing number of Ukrainian company owners started 
to break with their image of “roving bandits” who had stolen state assets during Ukraine’s early transition 
period without a thought for social costs. Following Mancur Olson (2000), they turned into so-called “sta-
tionary bandits”, who are interested in protecting their property rights and therefore seek to contribute to 
welfare and growth by improving the business climate. As a result, these “stationary bandits” understood 
2008; Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance (B), Kyiv, 13 October 2009.
13 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (A), Kyiv, 13 November 
2008.
14 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 October 
2009.
15 Interview with staff member from Persha Fondova Rynka, Kyiv, 25 September 2009; Interview with Ukrainian ex-
pert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 October 2009.
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that the violation of shareholders’ rights would harm their efforts to capitalize assets on international 
markets (see also Puglisi 2008; Melnykovska/ Schweickert 2008).
International donors anchored the growing interest of Ukrainian firms in international capital markets by 
setting up training programs and further initiatives to develop Ukraine’s corporate law. In 2003, following 
an initiative by the IFC, ten Ukrainian companies from the energy, telecommunications and banking sec-
tors as well as Western consultancy firms operating in Ukraine began to promote self-regulation regarding 
the protection of shareholders’ rights. They approached the SSMSC with a request to develop voluntary 
Corporate Governance Principles on the basis of the OECD Code of Corporate Governance (Mycyk et al. 
2007; Onyschuk-Morozov/Ryabota 2008). IFC experts helped SSMSC staff to familiarize themselves with the 
OECD Code and respective codes in EU member states.16 Within a few months, the SSMSC issued Ukraine’s 
Corporate Governance Principles, which were subsequently adopted by the ten companies. Their motiva-
tions for supporting voluntary Corporate Governance Principles were varied: While some were interested 
in improving their reputation among international donors, others were interested in promoting the protec-
tion of shareholders’ rights in the face of constant violations happening on the Ukrainian market.
From the mid-2000s onwards, this voluntary commitment to the protection of shareholders’ rights spread 
beyond the initial adopters of Ukraine’s Corporate Governance Principles thanks to encompassing public 
awareness campaigns financed by the ten initial adopters as well as additional corporate governance train-
ing of Ukrainian companies set up by the IFC.17 An increasing number of Ukrainian firms were striving to 
capitalize their assets on international markets and wanted to get listed on stock exchanges in Warsaw, 
Frankfurt or London, or to issue Eurobonds on international stock exchanges (Khisanov et al. 2006).
Around the same time, the distribution of property rights had more or less come to an end with pri-
vate ownership reaching 88,2 percent in 2004 (Dubrovskiy et al. 2007; Paskhaver/Verkhovodova 2008). 
Consequently, even Ukraine’s big industrial holding companies, who had acquired most of their assets 
during the “wild” 1990s and 2000s, began to transform into “stationary bandits” in order to capitalize their 
money on international markets (Shinkarenko 2007; Puglisi 2008). The reward of market access started 
to outweigh the costs of non-convergence towards European and international shareholders’ rights for 
some powerful Ukrainian businessmen. The holdings started to hire Western managers, who began to 
restructure the holding companies and disclose ownership structures and began to publish financial re-
ports on the basis of international accounting standards (Puglisi 2008). As a result, one of them, Konstantin 
Zhevago’s “Finance and Credit”, placed an initial public offering (IPO) on the London Stock exchange with 
his firm Ferrexpo. Others successfully invested in metallurgy or shipbuilding sectors in Eastern Europe 
(Goshovskii 2008).
16 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 October 
2009.
17 Two IFC projects focusing on corporate governance took place from 1997-2002 and from 2002-2007. During the 
first project, the IFC trained about 13 percent of Ukraine’s active corporations on corporate governance, provided 
over 5000 consultations and advised 67 pilot enterprises on sound corporate governance. According to the project 
reports, 50 percent of the pilot enterprises saw greater success in initiating negotiations with investors, attracting 
investment, finding partners, and obtaining financing. The report of the first project is available at http://www.ifc.
org/ifcext/tatf.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/Chapter_4.pdf/$FILE/chapter_4.pdf; 1 September 2011.
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Although the mid-2000s witnessed the emergence of “stationary bandits”, they still saw many experiences 
of “roving bandits” for whom the reward of market access did not outweigh the costs of regulatory con-
vergence. Instances of share dilution, the blocking of shareholders’ meetings and corporate raiders were 
still characterizing Ukraine’s corporate life. Some of the same industrial holdings that tried to polish their 
image for international investors were also involved in share dilution by almost 40 percent in some of their 
subsidiaries (Mycyk et al. 2007).
Several of these incidences directly harmed Western firms who had increasingly entered the Ukrainian 
market in the early 2000s. Consequently, foreign investors mobilized the two major business associations 
representing the interests of Western firms in Ukraine, the European Business Association in Ukraine 
(EBA)18 and the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAMB),19 to become more actively engaged in 
promoting the protection of shareholders. As a result, a “window of opportunity” opened up for a renewed 
attempt to adopt the JSC Law. In late September 2006, the IFC and USAID initiated another Corporate 
Governance Task Force at the SSMSC in order to prepare a new draft law that would take various interests 
into account. This time, the task force also comprised AMCHAMB and EBA representatives. In addition to 
the earlier demands raised by international donors and the PFTS Association concerning “voice” and “exit” 
for shareholders and the abolishment of CJSCs, the two Western business associations wanted the JSC Law 
to prohibit the transfer of shares through gifts. They also called for a provision stating that general share-
holder meetings would only be allowed to take place at the JSC’s registered address since Western firms 
had suffered from arrangements “behind the scenes”.20 In February 2007, the Cabinet of Ministers under 
Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich submitted the JSC Draft Law to the Ukrainian parliament, which had been 
prepared by the SSMSC in the framework of the Task Force on Corporate Governance. The law was then ad-
opted at the first reading, with the condition that the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Policy would 
thoroughly revise the draft law taking into account the comments of Members of Parliament. The fact that 
the JSC Draft Law was not immediately axed by the parliament after the first reading is owed to the fact 
that some of the owners of the aforementioned industrial holdings held seats in various political fractions. 
As mentioned earlier, they had now become “stationary bandits” and changed their attitudes towards the 
protection of shareholders’ rights accordingly. In this respect it is telling that Yuri Voropaev, the former 
lawyer of one of Ukraine’s leading Ukrainian businessmen, Rinat Akhmetov, headed the Parliamentary 
Committee on Economic Policy. The fact that this committee was now in charge of revising the JSC Law 
for the second reading underlines the growing interest among some powerful industrial holdings in the 
adoption of the JSC Law.
In order to accommodate the important interests of various business groups, the Parliamentary Committee 
did, however, make some important changes to the JSC Draft Law. The most crucial one concerned the 
provision stating that all CJSCs must become public JSCs that fall under the jurisdiction of the JSC Law, 
18 EBA Ukraine was founded in December 1999 on the initiative of the Delegation of the European Commission to 
Ukraine (see http://www.eab.com.ua).
19 AMCHAMB Ukraine was founded in 1992 (see http://www.chamber.ua).
20 Interview with Ukrainian expert on corporate governance from a Western donor organization (A), Kyiv, 13 November 
2008; Interview with staff member from Persha Fondova Rynka, Kyiv, 25 September 2009; Interview with Ukrainian 
Expert on Corporate Governance from a Western donor organization (B), Kyiv, 13 October 2009; Interview with 
Ukrainian expert on corporate governance (C), Kyiv, 22 October 2009.
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as demanded by the PFTS association of local brokers and securities dealers and others. Instead, the 
Committee proposed that only CJSCs with more than 100 shareholders must turn into public JSCs in order 
to gain the support of influential members of the Ukrainian parliament who represented the interests 
of big industrial holdings with a few shareholders. Yet, all other propositions by the task force remained 
part of the draft. On 17 September 2008, Voropaev presented the draft before the parliament, where it 
was adopted by 358 of 450 votes. On 22 October 2008, President Yushchenko signed the JSC law. The law 
entered into force in April 2009 but existing JCSs were granted a two-year transitional period, during which 
they must be brought into compliance with the JSC Law.
It is therefore too early to judge to what extent the JSC Law will truly promote the de facto protection of 
shareholders. Further, it needs to be seen to what extent the SSMSC and the PFTS stock market turn into 
viable regulators who possess sufficient capacities to enforce the law.
Notwithstanding, the previous analysis shows that a complex interplay of policy-specific conditionality 
based on economic rewards, i.e. access to European and international capital markets, and multiplex ca-
pacity-building targeted at both state regulators and firms helped decreasing adaptational costs, thereby 
weakening the domestic opposition against policy reforms. At the same time, both mechanisms helped 
diversify and empower domestic supporters to demand more transparent and predictable treatment of 
shareholders. If it had not been for external actors creating and empowering the domestic pro-reform co-
alition of securities regulators, brokers and firms from the mid-1990s onwards, increasing market pressures 
to enter Western capital markets in the early 2000s would not have been anchored by existing regulatory 
arrangements. Further, it is unlikely that the adopted law would have contained any provision forcing CJSCs 
into public JSCs without the pressure from the association of local brokers and securities regulators. In turn, 
the failure of legislative reforms in the early 2000 showed that multiplex capacity-building is unlikely to do 
the job if policy-specific conditionality applied by external actors is not based on economic rewards that 
outweigh the costs of regulatory convergence for powerful domestic actors.
5. Policy Change in Ukraine’s Technical Standards21
Unlike in the case of shareholders’ rights, the EU, rather than international donors such as USAID or the IFC, 
diversified and empowered reform-minded groups in the field of Ukraine’s technical standards by initiat-
ing major assistance projects upon enforcement of the PCA in 1998. In 2000, European experts began to 
serve as legal advisors for the Ukrainian state regulator, the DSSU, and the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy. 
To ensure adoption of EU compliant laws and the creation of regulatory arrangements as prescribed by EU 
directives, the European experts recommended to introduce the concept of voluntary standards and to 
break-up the monopoly of the DSSU by stipulating the institutional separation of standardization (setting 
standards) from conformity assessment (enforcing the standards).
European experts were able to ally themselves with a small group of regulators within the DSSU working for 
the department charged with the accreditation of conformity assessment bodies. This group of regulators 
21 A slightly revised version of the following case study analysis is published in Langbein/Wolczuk (2011).
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understood the necessity of these reforms for Ukraine’s future integration into world markets and the 
attraction of foreign investments. In addition, these regulators could expect an increase in their regula-
tory power since EU legislation foresees the establishment of a separate public agency for accreditation.22 
Thanks to their support and lobbying activities, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a law that led to the es-
tablishment of the National Accreditation Agency of Ukraine (NAAU) in 2002. However, DSSU’s leadership 
ensured that another law, which assigns the power to appoint conformity assessment bodies to the DSSU, 
was not scrapped (AFNOR-SWEDAC-UNI Consortium 2004; Palianytsia 2005). Owing to this contradictory 
legislative framework, DSSU could duplicate the NAAU’s tasks and thus weaken its regulatory power, while 
at the same time demonstrating its will towards policy reforms vis à vis the European partners.23
The other proposals of the European experts did yet not find their way into the final versions that were 
submitted to the Ukrainian parliament for approval. The monopolist regulator DSSU was simply not willing 
to share its regulatory powers with other public and private entities. Further, Ukraine’s reliance on public 
control rather than public-private coordination (as functioning on the EU single market) allowed DSSU’s 
staff to take bribes from Ukrainian producers and importers who desired faster service and fewer inspec-
tions (IFC 2008). In essence, DSSU’s opposition prevented full adoption of EU rules and practices.24 The 
sources for DSSU’s power are threefold:
First, DSSU’s staff did not have to fear any sanctions for opposing convergence with EU rules from supe-
rior bodies, such as the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy. Ukraine’s aspirations for membership were mere 
political rhetoric. In reality, the political elite did not sanction inertia or opposition against policy reforms 
(Langbein/Wolczuk 2011).
Second, possible political gains from convergence with EU technical standards were low. The main con-
stituencies, Ukrainian machinery producers, had mixed interest in policy reforms despite the application 
of policy-specific conditionality based on access to the European market in exchange for regulatory con-
vergence. On one hand, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) were beginning to see the benefits 
of Ukraine’s economic growth from 2000 onwards. For them, the GSP, through which the EU lowered its 
import tariffs for Ukrainian machinery as early as 1993, became a strong reward in exchange for regulatory 
convergence. SMEs turned to specializing in the export of parts and components of machinery to the EU 
since the costs of upgrading represented only four percent of total production costs given the low value of 
these commodities. On the other hand, producers of heavy machinery and equipment were not interested 
in convergence with EU technical standards. They mainly sold their products on the Ukrainian market or 
exported to former Soviet republics where Ukrainian standards and certifications were accepted. Similar 
to the dynamics shaping the case of shareholders’ rights until the early 2000s, parts of Ukrainian business, 
22 Interview with EU Official from DG Relex, Kyiv, 1 February 2008; Interview with European expert on technical 
standards, Kyiv, 24 January 2008.
23 Interview with EU Official from DG Relex, Kyiv, 1 February 2008; Interview with European expert on technical 
standards, Kyiv, 24 January 2008.
24 Interview with EU Official from DG Relex, Kyiv, 1 February 2008; Interview with European expert on technical 
standards, Kyiv, 24 January 2008.
20 | KFG Working Paper No. 33| December 2011 
i.e. the producers of heavy machinery, did not consider access to the EU market as a sufficient reward 
for policy reforms. Unlike SMEs, they would need to spend a higher percentage of production costs (12.3 
percent) in order to be eligible for export to the EU (ECORYS/CASE 2007). In addition, Ukrainian producers 
of heavy machinery feared their limited competitive advantage on the EU market and increasing imports 
from Europe should EU rules become mandatory in Ukraine (Pindyuk 2006).25
Third, in the context of state capture, these producers of heavy machinery were represented either in the 
Ukrainian parliament or occupied crucial positions in Ukraine’s state bureaucracy. Therefore, the legislator 
acted as an extension of big machinery producers and the DSSU. Members of Parliament made no efforts 
to increase regulatory convergence when respective legislative initiatives were discussed in the Ukrainian 
parliament in 2001. Instead, the parliament accepted the continued use of mandatory standards and the 
system of public regulation through the monopolist state regulator DSSU.
Notwithstanding domestic opposition against policy change, the EU continued to diversify domestic sup-
port by targeting its assistance at the state regulator DSSU. Following the launch of another assistance 
project in 2003, the Ukrainian Institute for Testing and Certification of Electric Equipment (UkrTest), which 
is subordinated to the DSSU and is in charge of certifying conformity assessments for electric equipment, 
sought to acquire the capacity to perform conformity assessments according to EU requirements for certain 
product groups. These were particularly relevant for SMEs producing parts and components. If successful, 
Ukrainian exporters to the EU would be able to use test results provided by UkrTest when applying for the 
CE mark from European certification bodies.26 Interactions with international and European standardiza-
tion organizations in regulatory networks further increased the incentives and capacities of the UkrTest for 
carrying out conformity assessments according to EU rules. In accordance with theoretical arguments that 
have been made concerning the effects of lesson-drawing through participation in regulatory networks 
(Rose 1991; Slaughter 2004), UkrTest’s regulators became dissatisfied with their domestic policies and 
began to study the experiences of their counterparts within the framework of the European Committee 
for Standardization (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC). 
Information from within UkrTest suggests that cooperation with European regulators was crucial to de-
velop much needed capacities for finally being awarded the right to perform conformity assessment for 
some product groups in 2006.27 
The launch of the ENP gave new impetus to domestic change from the mid-2000s onwards. In the aftermath 
of the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yushchenko, who became President of Ukraine in early 2005, issued the 
first comprehensive decree with regard to technical regulation in order to meet the obligations laid down 
in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. Faced with stronger political pressure, the DSSU had little choice but to show 
its commitment to convergence. As mentioned earlier, in December 2005 the DSSU and DG Enterprise 
and Industry therefore signed a special Action Plan for the Free Movements of Industrial Products. Being 
25 Interview with European expert on technical standards, Kyiv, 24 January 2008; Interview with representative of 
an Ukrainian business association, Kyiv, 15 February 2008; Interview with Ukrainian state official from Ministry of 
Industrial Policy, Kyiv, 25 February 2008; Interview with Ukrainian state official from Ministry of Economy, Kyiv, 28 
February 2008.
26 The CE mark is needed to place industrial products on the EU market.
27 Interview with representative of UkrTest, Kyiv, 18 March 2008.
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empowered by the political changes in Ukraine, the Ministry of Economy turned to the IFC in order to 
start a new legislative initiative to break up the monopoly of the DSSU. Similar to the situation in the early 
2000s, the working group came up with draft laws that envisaged the reduction of mandatory standards 
for industrial products as well as the gradual break-up of the DSSU. However, in April 2008, the Ukrainian 
parliament rejected the draft laws due to lobbying efforts of leading DSSU regulators and big producers of 
heavy machinery, which had remained strongly represented in Ukraine’s parliament.
It was only in December 2010 that one of the aforementioned draft laws, the law “On state market sur-
veillance over non-food products” got finally adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. As a consequence 
of Ukraine’s entry to the WTO in 2008 and intensified negotiations with the EU on the Deep Free Trade 
Agreement, economic and political pressures to reform Ukraine’s system of technical standards increased. 
The adopted law challenges DSSU’s oversight of products. It foresees that market surveillance, which en-
compasses the public monitoring of products placed on the market and the removal of unsafe products 
from the market, shall be pursued institutionally separate from conformity assessment (certification) (ICPS 
2011). The law was supposed to come into effect in April 2011. However, persistent resistance by the DSSU 
and big producers continues to prevent the drafting of secondary legislation for the implementation of 
the laws.  At the time of writing, DSSU still performs most tasks related to the setting and enforcement of 
technical standards.
The previous discussion suggests that in the field of technical standards, the combined effects of policy-spe-
cific conditionality based on economic rewards and dyadic capacity-building measures have only resulted 
in selective rule adoption and only partial set-up of public-private governance arrangements as applied in 
the EU single market. The EU applied policy-specific conditionality in the field of technical standards, but 
the reward of market access was not strong enough for all Ukrainian firms: While SMEs that produce low-
value added products benefit from market access, Ukrainian producers of heavy machinery considered 
market access not a sufficient reward for regulatory convergence. Consequently, they used their political 
influence to obstruct policy change. Further, in technical standards, external donors, here the EU, have 
only targeted their capacity-building measures at some state regulators. By contrast, assistance projects 
have not been set up to empower reform-minded SMEs to make their political claims. In a similar vein, 
assistance programs or regulatory networks have not been used to diversify demand among Ukrainian 
producers of heavy machinery who had political influence, but opposed policy change owing to their fear 
of growing Western importers. Due to a dyadic form of capacity-building, which was solely targeted at state 
regulators, demand among firms has not been diversified and reform-minded private actors have not been 
empowered.
6. Alternative Explanations
The comparative study of regulatory convergence towards EU rules in two policy fields in Ukraine has 
shown that the combined effects of policy-specific conditionality and multiplex capacity-building measures 
have increased incentives and capacities of domestic firms and state regulators to support policy reforms 
in shareholders’ rights resulting in comparatively high levels of regulatory convergence. By contrast, policy-
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specific conditionality combined with dyadic capacity-building did not sufficiently diversify domestic de-
mand for policy change in technical standards, resulting in partial regulatory convergence in this policy 
field.
A competing interpretation of the diverse outcomes could argue that Ukraine’s economic dependence on 
Russia was higher in the field of technical standards. Russia’s share in Ukraine’s total exports of machinery 
averaged at 42 percent in the six years between 2001 and 2007. In contrast, the EU’s share averaged 29 per-
cent during the same period.28 As far as the field of shareholders’ rights is concerned, Ukraine’s economic 
dependence on Russia does not, at first glance, seem to be so high. For instance, in 2005, the general share 
of foreign direct investments (FDI) flows from Russia to Ukraine was only six percent, while FDI flows from 
the EU stood at 35 percent (Vahtra 2005). Hence, Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009) would argue that lower 
dependence on Russia means a weaker constraint on EU rule transfer. However, it is important to note that 
a major part of Russia’s total investments in Ukraine come from offshore companies in Cyprus, the Virgin 
Islands and the Netherlands (Vahtra 2005; Blyakha 2009). Taking this into account, roughly 31.5 percent 
of Ukraine’s FDI stock came presumably from Russian investors in 2005. Accordingly, the EU’s share in 
Ukraine’s FDI stock is likely to be smaller than 35 percent, making the share of FDI from Russia in Ukraine’s 
total FDI stock at least equal to the share of the EU. Considering the significance of the Russian market 
for Ukrainian machinery producers and the significance of Russian investors for Ukraine’s capital market, 
we should thus expect equally low levels of regulatory convergence towards EU rules in Ukraine’s techni-
cal standards and shareholders’ rights. This expectation is, however, at odds with the observed empirical 
outcome.
An alternative explanation by students of regulatory competition would expect that regulatory conver-
gence to internationally acknowledged rules and norms progresses faster and more comprehensively in 
shareholders’ rights relating to export competing sectors such as financial services.29 By contrast, conver-
gence is expected to be less progressive in technical standards relating to import competing sectors like 
machinery (Vogel/Kagan 2004; Murphy 2004). Regulatory convergence in shareholders’ rights is likely to 
put domestic firms in a better position to attract foreign investors as well as to gain access to interna-
tional capital markets. By contrast, domestic firms in an import competing sector like machinery may be 
less interested in regulatory convergence in technical standards. This is because convergence will result 
in increasing imports of more competitive products, thereby crowding local producers out of the market 
(Murphy 2004). However, my empirical analysis shows that this approach has its limits in explaining the 
specific timing and character of policy change resulting in diverse outcomes across the two policy fields. 
While regulatory convergence in shareholders’ rights has, indeed, progressed more comprehensively than 
in technical standards, theories of regulatory competition cannot explain why Ukraine harmonized its na-
tional legislation with EU shareholders’ rights as late as 2008 despite the export competing character of 
financial services. Ukrainian firms could have attracted more foreign investment and would have been able 
to access European and international capital markets already in the 1990s if they had supported regulatory 
convergence in the field of shareholders’ rights. By contrast, in the field of technical standards we observe 
at least some progress in terms of rule adoption and the creation of regulatory arrangements as early as 
28 Own calculation based on Emerson (2006), Russian Federal Customs Service, State Statistics Committee of Ukraine 
and Eurostat.
29 I thank David Levi-Faur and Gary Marks who brought this to my attention.
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2001. Further, and in contrast to the aforementioned assumptions of students of regulatory competition, 
not all machinery producers in Ukraine oppose regulatory convergence and fear to be crowded out of 
the domestic market. Following Vogel and Kagan (2004), the more developed an economy is, the more 
complex it becomes and large aggregate groups such as capital or labor loose their meaning. Therefore, we 
need to disaggregate domestic interests of a policy field and analyze how incentives and capacities of vari-
ous producer groups and regulators for regulatory convergence can be increased (see also Börzel/Langbein 
forthcoming; Langbein/Wolczuk 2011).
7. Conclusion
This paper has shown that policy change in the European neighborhood is not doomed to failure despite 
the absence of an EU membership perspective. Instead, my findings suggest that there is a great deal of 
variation across policy fields even within one neighboring country. Contrary to prominent accounts in the 
literature on policy change in the European neighborhood, I show that cross-policy variation in regulatory 
convergence towards EU rules cannot be fully explained by making reference to misfit and adaptational 
pressures, or policy-specific conditionality (Börzel 2010; Gawrich et al. 2010; Ademmer/Börzel forthcom-
ing). Further, the empirical analysis revealed that the institutionalization of EU rules cannot explain the ob-
served cross-policy variation. In contrast to Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009), I find that third countries 
like the ENCs are not necessarily more inclined to take on EU rules if these rules are highly institutionalized, 
i.e. precise, legally binding and legitimate (see also Börzel/Langbein forthcoming).
To overcome the shortcomings of existing explanations, this paper engaged in a more nuanced analysis 
of the domestic incentives and capacities for taking on EU rules in a particular policy field and how such 
incentives and capacities are shaped by external factors. I have shown that the likelihood of regulatory 
convergences increases in policy fields where policy-specific conditionality is combined with multiplex ca-
pacity-building targeted at those public and private domestic actors needed to demand, set and enforce EU 
rules in the particular policy. By contrast, in policy fields where policy-specific conditionality is combined 
with dyadic capacity-building, regulatory convergence is less progressive.
In both policies under scrutiny, Ukraine’s shareholders’ rights and technical standards, policy-specific con-
ditionality was equally strong: Ukrainian state regulators and firms could be certain that regulatory con-
vergence would be rewarded with access to European and international markets. In both cases domestic 
actors did not, however, immediately consider market access as sufficiently beneficial to outweigh adapta-
tional costs. The costs of convergence in the two policies decreased for export-competing Ukrainian firms 
only when Ukraine’s economy started to recover in the early 2000s.
However, in the field of shareholders’ rights international donors had diversified domestic demand among 
Ukrainian bureaucrats, firms and brokers through multiplex capacity-building measures since the mid-
1990s. In the early 2000s, the distribution of property rights came to an end, resulting in growing interests 
of Ukrainian business to take on shareholders’ rights and capitalize their assets on foreign capital markets. 
At that time, multiplex capacity-building by external donors had already facilitated the creation of the 
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needed governance arrangements and continued to empower reform-minded Ukrainian businessmen and 
state regulators to make their claims. By contrast, in the case of technical standards, the economic rewards 
of market access were only flanked by dyadic capacity-building measures that diversified demand among 
some state regulators and empowered them to enforce certain policy changes. At the same time, external 
actors did not set up capacity-building measures for those Ukrainian producers for whom market access re-
mained an insufficient reward for policy change (i.e. producers of heavy machinery), or for reform-minded 
producers for whom market access became increasingly beneficial (i.e. SMEs producing low-value added 
machinery), thereby disempowering the reformers to turn their interests into political claims.
My findings dovetail with critics of conditionality-based approaches, arguing that the latter ignore the 
politics of institution building as a process aimed at empowering public and private actors to demand, set 
and enforce regulative institutions (Bruszt/McDermott 2009; Easterly 2006). The two cases presented here 
do not allow us to draw generalizations about the factors shaping cross-policy variation in regulatory con-
vergence in ENCs. Still, the findings have two implications for future research on policy change in countries 
outside the EU and their integration in European and international markets.
First, in view of the wide-ranging variation within one country, cross-policy comparisons seem to be more 
suited to explain the dynamics leading to regulatory (non-)convergence. The focus on macro-level factors 
such as membership aspirations or democratic development is not fruitful to explain policy change in the 
region. From this perspective, Ukraine would be a most likely case for regulatory convergence consider-
ing Ukraine’s membership aspirations and Ukraine’s relatively democratic political regime, if compared to 
other ENCs (Börzel 2010). Despite these favorable macro-level conditions, we observe diverse outcomes 
ranging from progressive to partial policy change. Hence, my findings imply that convergence towards 
EU rules can even occur in ENCs which do not seek EU membership or are less democratic than Ukraine. 
Instead, the impact of policy-specific conditionality and capacity-building on the configuration of domestic 
incentives and capacities in the various policy fields is key in explaining cross-policy variation in regulatory 
convergence towards EU rules. The findings of this analysis can thus provide important insights into the 
dynamics resulting in cross-policy variation in all other neighboring countries.
At the same time, the focus on regulatory convergence does not limit the generalizability of the findings 
to market-related fields. Even in non-market-related fields, such as anti-corruption, migration or human 
rights, convergence towards EU rules is more likely if the combined effects of policy-specific conditionality 
and multiplex capacity-building measures increase domestic incentives and capacities for policy change. 
Market access is unlikely to be the key incentive in non-market-related fields, unless external actors explic-
itly tie market access to policy reforms in these fields. Alternatively, other incentives, such as visa facilita-
tion or direct payments, may facilitate convergence in non-market-related fields if they are flanked by 
capacity-building measures targeted at relevant public and private rule takers.
The second insight of this paper concerns the fact that the EU is not the only external force that is shaping 
policy change in the European neighborhood, nor is it always the most active one, as suggested by some 
studies on the region (Lavenex 2008; Wolczuk 2007; Gawrich et al. 2010). Donors like USAID or the IFC 
often promote convergence towards EU rules in countries where EU leverage is generally weaker due to 
the lack of an EU membership perspective. In fact, they have been the most active external promoters of 
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convergence in the field of shareholders’ rights, while EU activities have been rather modest in comparison. 
In areas like technical standards, it is rather surprising that the IFC supports convergence towards EU prod-
uct standards. These are actually conceived as a countermovement to globalization since they protect EU 
producers from competition with the non-EU markets (Lyngaard 2008). These findings imply that students 
of the European neighborhood should not limit their analysis to the EU’s impact on policy change in the 
region, but shall increasingly take into account the impact of international donors or multinational compa-
nies (for a similar argument see Börzel/Langbein forthcoming).
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Howard, Marc Morjé 2003: The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
ICPS 2011: Market surveillance in Ukraine. Reforms on the way to the European market, Kyiv: International 
Center for Policy Studies.
IFC 2008: Technical Regulations Survey: Ensuring Economic Development and Consumer Protection, Kyiv: 
International Finance Corporation.
Jacoby, Wade 2004: The Enlargement of the European Union and NATO. Ordering from the Menu in Central 
Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jacoby, Wade 2006: Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution. External Influences on Postcommunist 
Transformations, in: World Politics 58/4, 623-651. 
28 | KFG Working Paper No. 33| December 2011 
Jordana, Jacint/Levi-Faur, David (eds) 2004: The Politics of Regulations. Institutions and Regulatory Reform 
for the Age of Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Kelley, Judith 2006: New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the New European 
Neighbourhood Policy, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 44/1, 29-55.
Khisanov, Igor 2006: Incubator of business celebrities, in: Expert Ukraine May 2006/1, 20-22.
Langbein, Julia 2010: Patterns of Transnationalization and Regulatory Change beyond the EU: Explaining 
Cross-Sectoral Variation in Ukraine, Unpublished PhD Thesis, San Domenico di Fiesole: European 
University Institute.
Langbein, Julia/Wolczuk, Kataryna 2011/forthcoming: Convergence without Membership? The Impact 
of the European Union in the Neighbourhood. Evidence from Ukraine, in: Journal of European 
Public Policy Online First, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13501763.2011.61413
3 (19 September 2011).
Lavenex, Sandra 2008: A governance perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration 
beyond conditionality?, in: Journal of European Public Policy 15/6, 938-955. 
London Stock Exchange 2010: Admission and Disclosure Standards, in: http://www.londonstockexchange.
com/companies-and-advisors/main-market/documents/brochures/admission-and-disclosure-
standards.pdf; 20 April 2010.
Lynggaard, Kennet 2011: Domestic change in the face of European Integration and Globalization: 
Methodological Pittfalls and Pathways, in: Comparative European Politics, 9/1, 18-37.
McFaul, Michael 2002: The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in 
the Postcommunist World, in: World Politics 54/2, 212-244. 
Melnykovska, Inna/Schweickert, Rainer 2008: Bottom-up or top-down: what drives convergence of 
Ukraine‘s institutions towards European standards?, in: Southeast European and Black Sea 
Studies 8/4, 445-468. 
Murphy, Dale D. 2004: The Business Dynamics of Global Regulatory Competition, in: Vogel, David/ Kagan, 
Robert (eds): Dynamics of Regulatory Change, Berkeley: University of California Press, 84-117.
Mycyk, Adam/Cook, Elizabeth/Fedoruk, Dmytro 2007: Corporate governance and disclosure in Ukraine, in: 
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 4/1, 59-74.
Okunev, Alexander 2005: Ukraine, in: Pierce, Chris (ed.): The Handbook of International Corporate 
Governance. A Definite Guide, London: Institute of Directors, 415-434.
Onyschuk-Morozov, Motria/Ryabota, Vladislava 2008: Promoting Corporate Governance in Ukraine, in: 
EBRD (ed.): Law in Transition, Securities Markets and Legal Reform in Ukraine, London: European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 82-89.
Palianytsia, Andrey 2005: Technical Regulations Study, Kyiv: Ministry of Economy and European Integration 
of Ukraine.
Paskhaver, Alexander/Verkhovodova, Lidia 2008: Further Privatization in Ukraine: Political Aspects. Kyiv: 
Center for Economic Development.
Pistor, Katharina 2000: Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights in Transition Economies, 
in: European Business Organization Law Review 1/1, 59-110. 
Pindyuk, Olga 2006: Ukraine: Foreign Trade and Industrial Restructuring, Paper prepared within the 6th EU 
Framework Program project „Industrial restructuring in the NIS: experience of and lessons from 
the new EU Member States“, INDEUNIS, No. 516751. 
Puglisi, Rosaria 2008: A window to the world? Oligarchs and foreign policy in Ukraine, in: Fischer, Sabine 
(ed.): Ukraine: Quo vadis?, Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 55-86.
Rodrik, Dani/Subramanian, Arvind/Trebbi, Francesco 2004: Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions 
Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, in: Journal of Economic Growth 9/2, 
131-165. 
                                Organizing Regulatory Convergence Outside the EU  | 29
Rose, Richard 1991: What is lesson-drawing?, in: Journal of Public Policy 11/1, 3-30.
Scharpf, Fritz W. 1997: Games Real Actors Play: Actor Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, Boulder: 
Westview. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank 2009: Europeanisation beyond Europe, in: Living Review on European Governance 
4/3.
Schimmelfennig, Frank/Scholtz, Hanno 2008: EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighborhood. 
Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange, in: European Union 
Politics 9/2, 187-215.
Shinkarenko, Inna 2007: Pionery i zinniki [Pioneers and Cynics], in: Expert Ukraina 26 (123).
Slaughter, Anne-Marie 2004: A New World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
SSMSC 1998: Annual Report, Kyiv: State Securities and Stock Market Commission of Ukraine.
SSMSC 2000: Annual Report, Kyiv: State Securities and Stock Market Commission of Ukraine.
UEPLAC 2008 Regulatory impact analysis of the transposition and implementation of the EC Low Voltage 
Directive into Ukrainian legislation, Kyiv: Ukrainian-European Policy and Legal Advice Center.
Vachudova, Milada 2007: Trade and the Internal Market in the European Neighborhood Policy, in: Weber, 
Katja/Smith, Michael E./Baun, Michael (eds): Governing Europe’s neighbourhood: Partners or 
periphery?, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 97-113.
Vahtra, Peeter 2005: Russian Investments in the CIS: Scope, Motivations and Leverage, in: Electronic 
Publications of Pan-European Institute 9, Turku: Turku School of Economics and Business 
Administration.
Vogel, David/ Kagan, Robert 2004: National Regulations in a Global Economy, in: Vogel, David/Kagan, 
Robert (eds): Dynamics of Regulatory Change, Berkeley: University of California, 1-41.
Warsaw Stock Exchange 2007: Code of best practices for WSE listed companies, in: http://corp-gov.gpw.pl/
assets/library/english/best_practices_2007.pdf; 20 April 2010.
Wolczuk, Kataryna 2004: Integration without Europeanisation: Ukraine and its Policy towards the European 
Union, in: EUI Working Papers RSCAS  2004/15, San Domenico di Fiesole: European University 
Institute.
Wolczuk, Kataryna 2007: Adjectival Europeanisation? The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, in: European Research Working Paper Series 18, Birmingham: 
European Research Institute.
Yakova, Iglika 2005/06: Czech Republic, ‘Europe’ and its farmers: How is agricultural interest intermediation 
affected by accession to the EU, in: European Political Economy Review 3/2, 112-142.
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe - Encouraging Academic Exchange and 
Intensive Research
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) is a new funding programme laun-
ched by the German Research Foundation in 2008. It is a centrepie-
ce of the KFG to provide a scientifically stimulating environment in 
which innovative research topics can be dealt with by discourse and 
debate within a small group of senior and junior researchers. 
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe „The Transformative Power of Europe“ 
brings together research on European affairs in the Berlin-Branden-
burg region and institutionalizes the cooperation with other univer-
sities and research institutions. It examines the role of the EU as pro-
moter and recipient of ideas, analyzing the mechanisms and effects 
of internal and external diffusion processes in three research areas:
• Identity and the Public Sphere
• Compliance, Conditionality and Beyond
• Comparative Regionalism and Europe’s External Relations
